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Introduction
The predation risk allocation hypothesis was proposed
more than 10 years ago to explain the allocation of an-
tipredator effort to situations when predation risk or dan-
ger varies temporally (Lima and Bednekoff 1999). Unlike
most previous theory, the hypothesis acknowledges that
danger can vary temporally, with alternating states of high
and low risk. The crux of the model is the assumption
that foragers must accumulate a fixed amount of resources
during a fixed period of time and that to do so, animals
should allocate vigilance, and thus indirectly foraging ef-
fort, differentially between periods with high or low risk.
Two predictions can be made from the theory. Given a
fixed proportion of time spent in each risk state, a higher
proportion of foraging should take place during the rel-
atively safer periods when the ratio of attacks between
high-risk and low-risk states increases (i.e., when the range
of predation risks is more exaggerated). Another predic-
tion is derived by fixing the attack ratio and varying the
proportion of time spent in each risk state. As propor-
tionately more time is spent under high risk, foragers are
expected to be less vigilant in both high-risk and low-risk
states, with most of the foraging performed in the low-
risk state. Under chronic high risk, foragers must allocate
some foraging in the high-risk state to accumulate their
fixed resource requirements. This leads to the initially
counterintuitive prediction that chronic high risk reduces
investment in antipredator behavior when in the high-risk
state.
Acceptance of the model has been swift, as shown by
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the 450 citations the article has garnered over the years.
More important, the hypothesis has been tested repeatedly
(see Ferrari et al. 2009 for a recent review). While the
results have been mixed thus far, enthusiasm for the model
is still strong. Here we highlight some underappreciated
assumptions of the model and of the empirical tests of
this hypothesis. First we examine how broadly the model
can be applied in ecological settings. Then we identify
constraints faced by foragers that may act to limit the
generality of the model. Finally, we point the way forward
for further theoretical developments and new empirical
tests of the model.
Model Assumptions
The model considers situations with contrasting risk, usu-
ally labeled high and low risk. At any point in time, the
forager is aware of whether it is in a high- or low-risk
state, but it cannot influence whether the risk is high or
low at any point or predict when the risk state will change.
The probability of a high-risk state occurring is constant
over time. Further, the forager cannot control the fraction
of the time for which the risk is high, nor can it retreat
to some protective area when risk is high or quit the sit-
uation early if it collects sufficient resources beforehand.
Foragers can control only the amount of time allocated to
vigilance in each risk situation and are thus considered
passive with respect to the pattern of risk experienced.
Taking all these factors into account, the sort of situation
to which the theory might apply is a mammalian herbivore
out foraging in the middle of a wide savannah. That is, it
applies to situations where the focal prey cannot influence
its intrinsic risk by selecting particular microhabitats ac-
cording to whether it currently perceives predation risk as
high or low. Thus, the focal forager must be essentially
immobile, or the habitat must be homogenous and not
offer any refuges from predation or other microhabitats
that differ in inherent predation risk from other available
microhabitats. High-risk situations might correspond to
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times when the focal forager detects the alarm calls of
others or other indirect cues of predator presence. There
could easily be selection for enhanced vigilance in response
to detecting such cues, with this translating into enhanced
vigilance in times of high predation risk (Creel et al. 2008).
However, the model does not apply to many situations
where there is more control over predation risk. For ex-
ample, animals often “know” (i.e., have been selected or
learn over time to behave as if they know) that feeding
farther from protective cover involves greater predation
risk or that foraging at the beginning or end of the day
is more risky. Many foragers can manipulate their pre-
dation risk, at least in part (Caro 2005). For example, birds
can often select from simultaneously available foraging
microhabitats that vary in their proximity to cover (San-
som et al. 2009). Such situations, again, are not represented
by the existing theory. Further, the model does not apply
to animals that can quit foraging early and retreat to pro-
tective cover; Lima and Bednekoff’s animals must stay
until the end of the time period.
Active risk management can lead to drastically different
predictions. For instance, a forager in a risky situation may
reduce vigilance to spend as little time as possible exposed
to predators and flee to cover during the remainder of the
high-risk period (Beauchamp and Ruxton 2007). In such
a case, vigilance is lower, not higher, in high-risk situations.
Similarly, animals may forage in larger or denser groups,
which provide greater protection (Krause and Ruxton
2002), leading again to a prediction of lower vigilance in
riskier situations (because high risk triggers an increase in
group size). All empirical tests of the model so far have
been conducted in the laboratory, where individuals ex-
perience risk rather passively. A challenge that we foresee
will be to determine how to apply the model to natural
settings, where foragers are more likely to manage pre-
dation risk actively, say, by selecting from available mi-
crohabitats that vary in inherent predation risk in response
to internal factors (such as food reserves) or external fac-
tors (such as the alarm calls of others). In addition, tests
of the hypothesis should exploit natural settings, given the
assumption that animals must know the predation risk
regime perfectly. In the laboratory, animals may not be
provided with sufficient time to learn a risk regime that
they have not been exposed to previously (Sih et al. 2000).
Cognitive Constraints
The model does not specify how individuals are expected
to evaluate the proportion of time spent in low- or high-
risk states. Through natural selection, animals may come
to react optimally to the sequence of high- and low-risk
states, but this would require that the proportion of time
spent in each risk state be stable over many generations.
Such a view would probably invalidate laboratory exper-
iments of the hypothesis unless the risk regime was ab-
solutely similar to the one in which animals evolved. In
their review of the hypothesis, Ferrari et al. (2009) argue
that animals probably learn the risk regime through re-
peated exposures to periods of high and low risks.
In the unpredictable-risk scenario presented above, es-
timates of this proportion must be based on information
collected over several cycles of high- and low-risk states.
In the end, animals in a given risk state should adjust their
current antipredator responses in anticipation of changes
in future risk based on their earlier pattern of exposure
to risk. The simplest scenario would consist of a predict-
able sequence of low- and high-risk states, which is fine
as long as we assume that foragers experience risk passively
(as noted above). Many empirical tests of the model have
considered this simplified risk scenario (Ferrari et al.
2009).
In general, several hours separate periods of high and
low risk, at least in empirical tests of the hypothesis that
have been published. However, the psychological literature
reveals that anticipation of future events based on earlier
exposure is unlikely to alter current behavior unless future
events occur within minutes. Rats, for instance, will work
hard to obtain vanishing resources despite the fact that all
their food could be obtained from a rich patch that ma-
terializes only 15 min later (Timberlake et al. 1987). That
is, they were unaffected by the availability of future for-
aging opportunities beyond a time horizon of 15 min. The
concept of a time horizon for integrating foraging infor-
mation has also been studied in other species, and the
horizon was found to be shorter in one bird species, longer
in monkeys, and the longest in human adults (Roberts
2002). Most empirical tests of the risk allocation hypoth-
esis have been conducted with fish or invertebrate species
for which the existence and magnitude of extended for-
aging time horizons are not known.
The concept of foraging time horizon is related to the
idea that animals discount future events because inter-
vening uncontrollable events are more and more likely to
reduce the likelihood of obtaining these future rewards.
The value of future rewards is expected to be strongest
when close in time and to decrease in an exponential-like
fashion with delay (Green and Myerson 1996). Beyond a
certain point, the value of future rewards becomes van-
ishingly small, thus delineating the foraging time horizon.
Such time discounting has also been related to lack of self-
control, or impulsiveness, which is common in most an-
imals (Logue 1988). Given that this window in time is
rather small, we should not expect major adjustments in
antipredator effort unless the switch to a period of con-
trasting risk is very close at hand. Therefore, while the
model does not specify the amount of time between risk
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situations, it would appear that for many species it should
be very short.
An inability to integrate events beyond a certain time
horizon certainly raises doubts about the ability of foragers
to foresee changes in the current state of risk. This static
view of risk, in which current behavior is informed only
by a limited amount of information, clashes with the dy-
namic view of predation risk emphasized by the risk al-
location hypothesis. We suggest that animals stuck in time
are not good candidates to learn and/or react to temporal
changes in predation risk.
Future Directions
Our foregoing discussion suggests that the ecological rel-
evance of the risk allocation hypothesis may be narrower
than it first appears. In addition, cognitive constraints
faced by animals may limit their ability to react optimally
to temporal changes in predation risk.
Where do we go from here? One avenue is to test the
hypothesis while ignoring our reservations about con-
straints or applicability to different systems. After all, if
the consensus after many tests is that the predictions hold,
then we should not be too concerned that the hypothesis
is unrealistic; all models are only an approximation of
reality. Several tests have been conducted so far, and the
results have been mixed. Nevertheless, assumptions of the
model have not always been met. In their review of the
empirical tests of the hypothesis, Ferrari et al. (2009) note
that animals in those tests have not always been food
stressed. This means that the theory’s assumption that
foraging must take place over the whole time period is
not mimicked in the experiment.
Trivial explanations for some predictions have not al-
ways been ruled out. As pointed out by some authors (e.g.,
Brown et al. 2006), repeated exposure to predators or in-
direct predatory cues without any obvious death risk may
lead to habituation, which represents a fading of responses
to risk with time. Therefore, the prediction that foragers
previously exposed to more risk should adjust their re-
sponses to a pulse of high risk to a lesser extent than those
previously exposed to lower risk is similar to that expected
under the habituation hypothesis. To rule out such ha-
bituation effects, it is important to ensure that the am-
plitude of the response to high risk after repeated expo-
sures does not change over time.
Another trivial explanation that has not been considered
thus far is that antipredator behavior is adjusted to current
hunger levels regardless of how long individuals are ex-
pected to spend in high- and low-risk states. We suggest
that temporal variation in danger can influence current
antipredator responses in animals that are unaware of the
risk regime. For instance, when facing long periods with
high risk, which must hinder the acquisition of resources,
animals will forage more in low-risk situations simply be-
cause they are hungrier, irrespective of their knowledge of
temporal risk distribution. To be convincing, an empirical
test must be able to show that animals have learned about
the temporal distribution of risk and are not trivially re-
sponding to multiple exposures to harmless risk (habit-
uation) or to their level of satiation.
A simple way to control for hunger level would consist
of this procedure: animals all experience a low-risk state
before facing either a higher-risk or the same low-risk state.
The assumption here is that animals need to forage under
each risk state to acquire their fixed food requirements
and that they cannot escape from risk. At the end of this
sequence, all animals are provided with food to compen-
sate for lower food intake in the high-risk situation. After
a suitable time lapse to ensure that foragers are hungry
and, more important, all equally hungry, all individuals
repeat the cycle anew. After several such cycles, individuals
are tested in the low-risk state to determine whether the
anticipation of higher risk later, with a low expected food
intake rate, entices foragers to increase their current food
intake rate.
Another avenue would be to develop the model further
to examine the consequences of allowing active responses
to risk and to integrate cognitive constraints. Many op-
timal foraging models beyond the risk allocation hypoth-
esis have been developed without considering the cognitive
abilities of animals. Behavioral ecologists have been urged
several times to include cognitive constraints in their mod-
els, and integration of mechanistic and functional consid-
erations can greatly expand the scope of models (Kacelnik
and Bateson 1996). The reservations that we have dis-
cussed certainly warrant a more critical look at the rele-
vance of the predation risk allocation hypothesis.
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Limulus polyphemus (Horse Foot Crab, Horseshoe Crab, or King Crab). 4, Young Limulus just out of the egg. 5, Terminal tail joint, Pterygotus
banksii. 6, Terminal tail joint, Pterygotus bilobus. 8, Terminal tail joint, Pterygotus ludensis. 9, P. bilobus. 12, L. polyphemus, 1 year old. “The anterior
edge of its enormous cephalic shield is not unlike in form the sausage, or mincemeat knife of our kitchens.” 13, Eurypterus remipes. 14, Sao hirsutus,
a trilobite. From “The Horse Foot Crab” by S. Lockwood (American Naturalist, 1870, 4:257–274).
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